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Judgment, Justice, and Art Criticism
  Jolanta Nowak 
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to expose a gap in the current
academic discussion of visual art criticism: the lack of serious
attention to the role of ethical judgment.  Critics tend either to
avoid discussing the judgment of art or they dismiss it as a
contemporary impossibility.  However, ethical criticism is
nonetheless practiced, albeit only occasionally and in an
under-theorized manner.  This paper calls for a
reconceptualization of ethical judgment in art criticism, a
reconceptualization that brings art into explicit relation with
ethics.
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Justice . . .  is a matter of judgment, and about
nothing does public opinion everywhere seem to
be in happier agreement than that no one has
the right to judge somebody else.[1]
When Arendt wrote this she was reflecting on responses to her
book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.
 As Arendt explains, justice demands judgment and it was
Eichmann’s inability to judge the moral status of Nazi ideology
which paved the way for him to commit the crimes he did.  On
this understanding, the exercise of judgment is central both to
guiding our behavior and to our understanding of relationships
with others. If this is true, there is an ethical imperative to
judge.
1. A judgment of Christian Boltanski’s Missing House
Leaving Arendt in the background for the time being, let us
consider an example in visual art criticism of one form of
judgment, a form I will call 'ethical judgment.[2]  This
example, written by Abigail Solomon-Godeau in 1998,
examines Christian Boltanski’s installation Missing House,
1990.[3]  As Solomon-Godeau explains, the work comprises
two parts.  The first is a site-specific installation in a vacant
block in Berlin.  On the block a house once stood that was
bombed during the allied attack of 1945.  The two houses on
either side remained standing. Boltanski’s work consists of
plaques on the walls of the remaining houses adjacent to the
destroyed building.  These plaques name the last inhabitants of
the missing house, their occupation, and time spent living in
the building.  The second part of Boltanski’s work consists of
(now dismantled) vitrines on another bombed site:  a former
arts and crafts exhibition building. These vitrines contained
specific, detailed information relating to the former inhabitants
of the missing house.  Since the vitrines have been removed
the only extant elements of Missing House are the plaques on
the vacant block.
In her analysis of the installation, Solomon-Godeau raised the
serious objection that Boltanski’s work does not make the fate
of either the building or its inhabitants sufficiently explicit.
Solomon-Godeau argues that we do not know, just by looking
at Boltanski’s work, that the house was bombed (though an
argument could easily be mounted that we do, as the dates
referred to in the work and its location should be enough of an
indication for anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of
twentieth- century history).  And, she goes on, the inhabitants
of the house have included both Jews and Germans—many
Jews occupied the building initially, and were replaced by
Germans as the Jews were almost certainly removed and then
killed prior to the bombing of the building.[4]  This information
was supplied explicitly only in the vitrines (though, again I
would argue that it is implied in the site of the bombed
house.)  
In her article Solomon-Godeau analyzed other works by
Boltanski in which she noted that this lack of differentiation
between individuals, types of people and their fate is a
common theme: a work such as Les Archives: Detective, 1987
does not make distinctions between victim or murderer; and
Boltanski’s modes of representation in general do not
distinguish between, for example, someone who died of
natural causes and someone who died as a consequence of
Nazi ideology.[5] For Solomon-Godeau, this refusal to make
distinctions between groups of people is extremely problematic
since “it implies a bottom line equivalency from which ethical
distinctions are banished.”[6]  This means that we are unable
to cast judgment on those represented.  A defense of
Boltanski’s work might argue that evident in the work is an
acknowledgement of a bottom line respect for all individuals
regardless of their deeds.
Whether or not Boltanski’s work can be defended against
Solomon-Godeau’s claims is not, however, the subject of this
essay.  What is of interest here is the nature of her discussion
of the work. Solomon-Godeau is making a judgment about
Boltanski’s Missing House and about an aspect of his practice
in general.  Solomon-Godeau’s key concern here is with
justice.  She perceives that there has been a lack of
recognition given to the original Jewish inhabitants of the
building and a lack of recognition given to the specific history
of the war.  She calls Boltanski’s work a “generic elegy” which
is “wholly inadequate to the historical, indeed to the ethical
requirements of historical commemoration.”[7]  
What is needed instead, says Solomon-Godeau, is an
acknowledgement in the work “of the singularity and
irreplacibility [sic] of what has been lost.”[8] Solomon-
Godeau’s main concern is with the extent to which the artist
has paid just attention to the history of the Second World War
and to the individuals who are referred to in the work (these
people include those who are referred to explicitly through the
use of plaques, and those who are referred to implicitly by the
absence of any mention of them). Solomon-Godeau has made
what she herself terms an "ethical" concern, a concern in this
case about the appropriate representation of individuals,
central to her reading of the work." Solomon-Godeau’s
discussion is an example of a kind of art criticism which, as
Emmanuel Levinas has put it, “measure[s] the distance”
between representation and human life.[9] 
Solomon-Godeau’s forthright judgment of Boltanski’s
installation is significant for several reasons.  It is significant
most obviously because the subject-matter of the work deals
 with questions of justice.  Boltanski’s work sets out to provide
(an opportunity to remember those who suffered grave
injustice, and in this sense it deals with ethical concerns and
thus invites ethical evaluation.  Solomon-Godeau’s response to
this invitation is important because it draws attention to the
need for an ethical approach to writing about art and because
it illuminates the notion that some kinds of art works demand
such an approach more than others.
Solomon-Godeau’s example of ethical judgment is also
significant because it is based on the assumption that, from an
ethical and historical point of view, it matters what art does.
 Her reading assumes that art is fundamentally linked to
politics and history, and that art plays a role in these domains.
 This means that art’s role is ripe for evaluation and that art
does not exist in a discrete realm separated from the demands
of ethics.  In so far as this kind of criticism recognizes that art
is at some level heteronomous, ethical judgment is invited by
(but not exclusively by) art practices that have emerged since
the end of modernist claims to art’s absolute autonomy.
 Artistic practices that claim that art is engaged with society
and the concerns of individuals, communities, history, and
politics are particularly open to the kind of ethical judgment of
which Solomon-Godeau’s work is one example.
This kind of judgment of art works, based on an
acknowledgement of art’s relative heteronomy is, by necessity,
distinct (but not necessarily completely divorced) from
historical forms of judgment.  This includes Greenbergian
judgments of artistic quality and Kantian versions of aesthetic
judgment.[10]  Therefore, Solomon-Godeau’s work is
significant because it illuminates a gap in the discussion of the
role and nature of one significant type of judgment in art
criticism:  a type of ethical judgment that asks about the
relationships between the representation of others and their
history, and about the nature of our experience of art.  This
issue, the position of ethical judgment in visual art criticism
over the last twenty-five years, is the focus of this essay.
I suggest here that judgment in general should be understood
as intrinsic to the task of art criticism.  I argue that judgment
is under-theorized in contemporary visual art critical circles
and that the ethical judgment of art is of particular
importance.  My position is something of a departure from
dominant understandings of judgment in these circles, for since
the end of modernism, judgment (of whatever type) has been
widely held to be either outmoded or inappropriate.  This is
especially true for critics who write for academic art journals.
 The reasons for this, as I will explain, are both historical and
ideological.  I want to show that despite judgment’s ‘bad
name,’ critics do on occasion judge art works, and they judge
these from an ethical point of view.  This is often the case
when art works deal explicitly with questions of justice, but I
also want to suggest that ethical judgment should not be
restricted only to controversial art works. Ethical judgment
requires, therefore, both acknowledgment and theorization. 
After developing my discussion of ethical judgment, I will then
argue that this kind of art criticism allows substantial
questions to be asked of art, and to the extent that it does
that, a specifically ethical form of judgment has a significant
role in criticism.
2. Judgment and art criticism
Judgment, understood broadly, is intrinsic to the nature of
criticism.  James Elkins is one writer who argues for the
relevance and centrality of judgment.  In describing the place
of judgment in criticism, he put it this way:  “Art criticism is a
forum for the concept and operation of judgment, not merely a
place where judgments are asserted, and certainly not a place
where they are evaded.  At the same time, criticism cannot
become exclusively a forum for meditation on judgment, as
Krauss once said, because then it would lose itself in another
way—it would dissolve into aesthetics.”[11] Elkins identified
art criticism as an evaluative discipline, and criticism’s task of
interpreting and judging works of art is what distinguishes it in
emphasis from art history and aesthetics, even while there are
important overlaps between these three disciplines.  By
definition, criticism’s primary concern is with judgment.[12]
While the concept of judgment is inseparable from the
discipline of art criticism, the nature of criticism and, in
particular, the role and nature of judgment in criticism are not
without controversy.  The question of judgment in art criticism
has been the topic of much international debate with a recent
spate of books, articles and conferences on the subject.[13]
 Rarely has judgment (of any kind) been championed in these
forums.[14]  Indeed, the overwhelming response to the
question of judgment, not only ethical judgment but also
aesthetic judgment and questions of judgment of quality, is to
argue that it is, if not impossible, then at least
undesirable.[15]  As Elkins has noted, art criticism in recent
times has been marked by a “flight from judgment … and [an]
… attraction …[to] description.”[16] Most (of what is referred
to as) art criticism is not concerned with judgment.[17]
 Judgment is most usually dismissed as no longer valuable or
central to the critics’ task. 
Nancy Princenthal gave voice to a negative attitude toward
judgment in 2006, writing that “judgment is simply not the
most important thing a critic does.  The question of whom, and
what a categorical judgment serves has no clear answer. . . .
it tends to shut down fruitful discussion.”[18] Princenthal’s
statement is not only dismissive but also belies a limited
conception of the significance and nature of judgment.  This is
an understanding of judgment that implies an unjustified,
unreflective pronouncement and refuses to allow for
elaboration or discussion.  It is an altogether different
understanding of judgment from that, for example, which a
person might make of him- or herself after moral reflection on
his or her own actions, or which a critic might make of art
works as a result of considered ethical questioning.
Dependence on a denuded understanding of the nature of
judgment goes some way in accounting for why judgment in
general (and not just ethical judgment) is largely absent in
contemporary criticism and the discussion around that
criticism. There are also two deeper reasons why judgment is
often dismissed.  The first is related to the relationship
between the history of judgment in art criticism and changes
in art in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. References
to judgment in art criticism are often understood to refer back
to the work of Clement Greenberg, whose writing is
understood as paradigmatic of a style of criticism that is no
longer regarded as appropriate:  the most important or
interesting things in contemporary art are not typically related
to questions of quality, technical innovations, or the formal
aspects of the work.  Greenberg is also regarded as
exemplifying an absolutist style of judging, one which is a long
way from contemporary subjectivist approaches to
writing.[19]  On this reading, Greenbergian judgment is
neither appropriate nor worthwhile.  Similarly, neo-Kantian
aesthetic judgment is generally not regarded as significant.  At
least since the advent of conceptual art, it is less about formal
qualities and aesthetic experience and more about ideas.[20]
 The object of judgment in art criticism has altered, leaving
the critic with the sense of being bereft of an object to
judge.[21]
The second key reason why judgment is regarded with a high
degree of suspicion is ideological.  The concept of judgment is
deemed to be outmoded since it presupposes a claim to an
objective standpoint from which to judge.  To judge is to judge
against a model or an ideal and, in this sense, judgment
implies metaphysics.[22]  This implicit metaphysics stands at
odds with what is, as Solomon-Godeau put it in a discussion
on art criticism, the contemporary “institutionalization of the
notion of pluralism.”[23]  This hegemony recoils at the notion
of an expert art critic who claims to make judgments against a
pre-determined standard.  Boris Groys also noted that “The
development of art in this century has ended in a pluralism
that relativizes everything…and no longer allows for critically
grounded judgment.”[24] The invocation of metaphysics leads,
then, to perhaps the most significant reason for the rejection
of judgment as a key feature of the critic’s task. Skepticism
regarding the possibility of a stable, objective vantage point
and the widespread contemporary rejection of metaphysics
and the acceptance of relativism precludes the possibility of
judgment.  Judgment is deemed no longer relevant because it
is coextensive with normative claims:  to judge is to declare
that something is good or bad.
This suspicion about judgment is often intensified when that
judgment is of an explicitly ethical or moral nature.  The
culture wars debates of the 1980s and 1990s in the US, the
debates in the media which have courted the work of Andres
Serrano internationally, and the public furor that erupted in
Australia over the work of local photographer Bill Henson, all
hinged on competing judgments, most usually conducted in the
mainstream media rather than in academic art journals (the
latter tended to shy away from making direct judgments about
the works in question).[25] The consequences of the
judgments published in the mainstream media have proven in
some instances to be severe:  the cutting of funds to arts
programs and the threat of censorship.  These kinds of
experiences have contributed to the art community’s wariness
about judgments made in the name of ethics, and this, in turn,
has asserted (on the part of the mainstream media) an
understanding of art’s heteronomy which goes beyond what is
acceptable for that community:  an understanding of art as
being at the behest of tabloid-style moralism.  In this way,
ethical judgment is often taken to be an activity circumscribing
art practice in a way that runs counter to claims for artistic
freedom.
While critics are wary of ethical judgment and of judgment in
general, this wariness should be understood in the context of
the changing role of the critic.  Judgment is associated with a
potentially antagonistic relationship between the critic and the
artist, rather than the collaborative relationship which many
contemporary academic art critics seek.[26]  This collaborative
approach is a long way from the critic's task which, from the
late eighteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, was
when the critic was to act as an arbiter between the art work
and the public, as an independent voice to guide the public.
 Judgment was central to this role.  Criticism is now often
understood as a practice that is either coextensive with art
practice or is a benevolent commentary on art works.
Many of the above reasons for judgment’s displacement from
art criticism were identified in a roundtable discussion
published in October in 2002.  George Baker, for example,
stated that “Never has it been more difficult to practice art
criticism.”[27]  The root of this difficulty lies in the issue of
judgment.  As David Joselit put it:  “what is hard to maintain
today is criticism as a mode of judgment that carries
weight.”[28]  Later in the discussion, Joselit explains that while
judgments are based on interpretation, “one of the crises of
criticism might arise from the fact that the concept of quality
has lost its legitimacy for people like us.  So you can’t say this
is good and that is bad, at least not in the ways in which it
was possible [in the past].”[29]  This goes to the heart of the
problem with judgment, since judgment is precisely about
deciding on the basis of some concept of quality.  As the
participants go on to discuss, the difficulty, or as Joselit
suggests, impossibility for a certain kind of art historian, in
practicing criticism as it has been understood historically is
related to the lack of consensus regarding criticism’s function,
and to the lack of serious attention to the implications of
judgment and the capacity for contemporary critics to carry
out such judgment.[30] 
According to those involved in the discussion, one reason for
the lack of serious interest in criticism (and hence in
judgment) is that the critic’s historical role (of judging good
art from bad, and thus of deciding which art should have
currency), has now been taken over by the curator.[31]  The
historically deeper reason, implied in the discussion, is that
Joselit’s “people like us” appears to refer to art historians and
critics who understand the history of art since modernism, and
who are not attempting to judge art against predetermined
criteria.  Art criticism is presented with particular problems
related to the current post-conceptual art climate.  Judgment
is now regarded as internal to art since the art work performs
its own self-critique of its relationship with the institution and
with the history of representation.[32]  
The investigation into art’s nature instigated by Marcel
Duchamp and later pursued by conceptual artists’ desire to
create work which would both insist that the meaning of the
work exists in the mind of the viewer and that would avoid the
apparent elitism of formalist art means that much recent art
has taken on board the evaluative and investigative function
previously assigned to criticism.  Indeed, since the 1960s and
1970s artists, including Joseph Kosuth, have claimed that the
criticism of art is conducted by the work itself, leaving the art
critic without a role to play.[33]  The task of the critic under
these circumstances is, as Elkins noted, to describe rather
than judge the way the work operates.  In the 1980s, this
descriptive role was reinforced with the advent of artists’ direct
engagement with theory, which has also been taken up by
many critics.  Once again the self-reflexive analysis of much of
this work, along with the complexity of the material, means
that the task of criticism has moved into explication.
Since the 1990s, judgment has been more or less out of art
criticism’s official picture and we have been left with varying,
and often anemic understandings of the critic’s role.  For
Joselit it is to “judge what constitutes an object;”[34]
similarly, for Baker one task of the critic is “to delineate the
field of artistic practice” as well as “to bring into public
discourse practices that are being silenced.”[35]  For Rosalind
Krauss, criticism involves “scanning the horizon for some new
blip appearing on it.”[36]  For Helen Molesworth, good
criticism is “a dialogue between texts and objects.”[37]  
The task of criticism might be summarized as an attempt to
articulate the place of a work in art history.  This task is
essential to understanding the meaning and significance of a
work, but it is a long way from judgment.  It is worth noting
that the logical extension of this very limited understanding of
judgment in art writing is that once something is deemed to
be art (or “our” kind of art), it is protected from the
responsibility that judgment (and ethical judgment in
particular) entails.  It is implied that art is a privileged practice
beyond the reach of the ethical judgment being argued for
here. When judgment does come into play for these critics, it
is often limited to choosing to ignore some kinds of art.[38]
 Therefore, the kind of judgment at work here is minimal; it is
concerned with sorting out and describing what will count as
art.
What, then, are the limitations of this minimal understanding
and use of judgment in art criticism?  As Elkins pointed out,
there are interesting questions to be asked of works of art,
including “What is the art’s present relation nowto the social
sphere?  How does this work enlarge my perception of reality?
” and, we could argue, these questions are the kinds of
questions which would result in a peculiarly ethical form of
judgment, if that judgment is concerned primarily with
understanding art’s relationship to and impact on the realm
outside art, including politics, history, and our relationship with
others.[39]  
Following Elkins’ lead on this issue, we might also ask about
the extent to which a particular work threatens to diminish
one’s perception of reality, and it is this latter kind of question
that seems to have motivated Solomon-Godeau in her ethical
critique of Boltanski’s practice.  Solomon-Godeau’s work opens
a space for the discussion of art’s relationship with the world.
Her criticism provides a way of articulating the meanings and
effects of the work. This, in turn, provides the viewer or reader
a forum with which to engage and within which to test
analyses of the work.  The key significance of ethical judgment
is, however, the basic assumption that underpins its practice,
namely that art cannot be divorced from the ethical.  A refusal
or hesitancy to judge presupposes not only a romanticism
about art and its role, but also an impossible autonomy for art
that presupposes a strange understanding of ethics.
At this point there are two things to note.  First, if the
argument that we need ethical judgment in criticism is
persuasive, then we need to rethink the need for and
consequences of judgment in the light of the criticisms and
hesitations about it cited above.  In other words, the dominant
discussion about judgment is inadequate to the practice of art
criticism.  Michael Newman hit the nail on the head when he
wrote that “The aporia of judgment in modernity—in modernity
as a historical fate—is...that we must judge, but “we”
cannot.”[40]  Our current situation, he explains, is one where
“the role of critical judgment...is thrown into question.”[41]
 The second point to note is that ethical judgments in
particular, despite all the arguments against them, are, in fact,
made about art works (as we see in Solomon-Godeau’s
writing), and in this sense it is clear that “we” can, and do,
judge.  But what is needed is a deeper investigation into how
and why to make such ethical judgments.
3. A contemporary tradition of judgment
Before considering what ethical judgment might be and why it
might be significant, it is useful to look briefly at two other
examples where critics have judged art works with questions
of justice at the forefront of their discussion.  This will
illuminate something of an unacknowledged tradition of
judgment in relation to art since the end of modernism and
the alleged end of judgment.  As with Solomon-Godeau’s work
on Boltanski, other influential academic art critics have been
concerned with analyzing the nature of artists’ representations
as they compare to historical facts, particularly when the work
in question is related to issues regarding historical
commemoration and justice.  We can see this in Benjamin
Buchloh’s reading of Gerhard Richter’s, Uncle Rudi, 1965.[42]
 This painting is, famously, a blurred copy of a family photo
that shows the artist’s uncle in Wehrmacht uniform during the
Nazi period, thus inscribing the artist himself within Germany’s
recent history.  The work, says Buchloh, marks an awareness
of “the necessity of representing this subject.”[43]  
In other words, for Buchloh, Uncle Rudi plays a role in the
construction of an understanding of Germany’s sense of its
own history through the manipulation of the image itself and
the manipulation of the context in which the image is seen. For
Buchloh, Uncle Rudi reveals the difficulties attendant to the
representation of Nazism and in this sense returns the viewer
to the question of how Germany might deal with its past.[44]
 What we see here is both a painting of a family snapshot and
a Nazi.  It is a domestic image that brings us into proximity
with a horrific regime.  Buchloh’s passing comment regarding
the significance of the work offers (at least implicitly) a
judgment about the significance of this art in political and
ethical terms:  that Uncle Rudi contributes to the productive
investigation of German history.  An awareness of such a
judgment encourages viewers to consider the work in relation
to ethics and politics, and in this sense ethical judgment
circumvents the refusal to judge which characterizes Arendt’s
understanding of Eichmann’s situation.
Similarly, the discussion surrounding the work of Anselm
Kiefer is in many ways exemplary of a residual
acknowledgment of the significance of judgment in art
criticism.  In Kiefer’s notorious series of photographs,
Occupations, 1969, the artist evokes historical moments while
performing the Sieg Heil salute in numerous places:  at the
Colosseum, at the Roman Forum, in a bath tub, and so
on.[45]  Concerned with the relationship between Kiefer’s
representation and an appropriate understanding of history,
Matthew Rampley notes that some critics (including Buchloh)
argue that Kiefer “is guilty of a regressive mythologization of
the question of German history.”[46]  Rampley himself
rehabilitates Kiefer on this charge, arguing that Kiefer both
romanticizes and questions the mythology informing
Nazism,[47] while Andreas Huyssen argues that his work
grapples with the question of how to represent the past and
concludes that “redemption through painting is no longer
possible.”[48]  
The concern of these critics is with justice and with analyzing
modes of representation in order to consider and judge the
extent to which Occupations bring us into an appropriate
relationship with history. Rampley does not say that it does
not matter what Kiefer does.  Rather, his intention is to
understand the implications of this art’s engagement with
history and politics. For Rampley, there is a question about the
effects and meaning of Kiefer’s practice and an assumption
that it is not acceptable merely to mythologize Nazism.
 Rampley argues that Kiefer’s work, judged against similar
criteria to that of Buchloh and Huyssen, can be understood as
doing something other than simply mythologizing Nazism:  it
is a broader investigation into the connections between
German culture and Nazism. Kiefer does this with a level of
ambivalence which, according to Rampley, “distances him
sufficiently from the tradition [of German romantic anti-
capitalism] to permit him to be regarded as interrogating it,
but only just.”[49]  
In this instance Rampley judges Kiefer’s work.  What Rampley
is also doing is making an ethical judgment that engages with
the judgments of other critics and draws different conclusions
from those of others.  Rampley’s judgment in this example is
not at all about closing down fruitful discussion (to borrow
Princenthal’s phrase).  On the contrary, the various judgments
made by several critics have provoked a productive and
instructive debate about the relationship between Kiefer’s
work and, in this instance, our understanding of history.  The
debate between critics of Kiefer is a collaborative investigation
into how to read and judge Kiefer’s work against the demands
of justice.  It is precisely the kind of forum for serious ethical
consideration I argued for above.
As the examples cited here suggest, critics acknowledge that
there is an ethical requirement at work in the analysis of art
that relates to historical questions of justice, and it is no
accident that the examples cited here refer to the Second
World War.  Indeed, the representation of any kind of
traumatic historical event demands an attentiveness to those
involved.  We can also see this in some of the literature
surrounding art works that take the September 11 attacks as
a central theme.  For example, in her examination of works
that present individuals ‘falling’ from the Twin Towers, Andrea
Fitzpatrick argues for a methodology of reading these works
that both acknowledges the vulnerability of those depicted and
examines the impact of that depiction on viewers who see it.
 In an explicitly ethical move, one that echoes Solomon-
Godeau’s call for just depictions of individuals, Fitzpatrick calls
for art works that produce, and art criticism that
acknowledges, “the dignification of the experiences of all the
subjects involved” in works of art, those depicted as well as
viewers.[50] 
Fitzpatrick's essay offers an example of criticism that regards
art as one instance of inter-human relationships and that
judges art accordingly.  This is about more than the
representation of history.  It is about the meaning of viewers’
experience of art.  Once again, this type of criticism regards
art as part of the world and as having an impact on it.  This
criticism understands ethics as infused in all aspects of human
experience and, in so far as that is true, then it is false to say
that we can not judge.[51]
4. Ethical judgment
Ethical judgment does, as we have seen here, take place in
academic art criticism, in spite of all the historical and
ideological reasons why many critics argue that it is no longer
possible.[52]  But while art criticism that deals with traumatic
events is illustrative of the contemporary practice of ethical
judgment, it does not follow that these kinds of instances of
judgment in art criticism are or should be exclusive to work
that invokes overt questions of justice. 
Precisely how ethical judgment should be characterized and
applied will depend on the description or understanding of
ethics that is brought into play.  For instance, taking up
Levinas’ description of ethics as constitutive of subjectivity,
means that all art, regardless of whether or not it deals
explicitly with questions of justice, history or human beings, is
answerable to ethics.  This is because in Levinas’ view, no
aspect of human experience can be divorced from the ethical.
 The task of Levinas’ critic is to compare the phenomenology
of our experience of art with his phenomenology of ethics.
 This approach (one with which I am sympathetic) means that
no art is beyond the reach of ethical criticism.[53]  Obviously
a different conception of ethics would result in a different
understanding of the task and scope of ethical judgment.
 What is needed in the discussion about art criticism is,
therefore, serious consideration about ethics itself and about
the way ethics might inform ethical judgment.
The call for ethical criticism I am making here has a direct
impact on our understanding of the role and value of art.
Ethical criticism asks about art’s relationship with politics and
history, and about the ethical character of the relationship
between the viewer and the art work.  Crucially, the task of
ethical criticism is also concerned with interrupting any
residual claims for art's autonomy.  Such claims are made
implicit in art created since modernism when it is assumed
that at some level art is not answerable to ethics.  While
contemporary art is understood not as autonomous but as
having a direct relationship with the realm outside art, ethical
criticism is inextricable from an acknowledgement and analysis
of this relationship.[54]  
Judging an art work joins art with ethics, it calls art out of any
partial or wholly autonomous sphere it might claim to reside in
and situates it instead in the realm of human needs and
experiences; it renders art active in the world and therefore
accountable.[55]  In what other way can we have fruitful
discussion about important notions of, for example, historical
justice in art, other than by analyzing and then deciding on
the appropriateness of representation and of experience?  Any
refusal to judge art in this way demands a response to the
difficult question of what makes art so special that it can be
situated beyond the reach of ethical considerations.
Ethical judgment, then, is not a moralizing about art but a
practice that investigates the adequacy and nature of art’s
relationship with reality.  As Plato explained in the Theaetetus,
the concern of judgment is with things that are, and this
means that judgment is a form of knowledge.[56] So the
objective standpoint necessary for judgment is reality (as well
as we can understand that).  For Levinas, reality and ethics
are inseparable.  The significance of not attending to this
reality threatens to allow injustice to remain unchecked:
 malign stereotypes perpetuated, histories excluded, viewer’s
behavior misguided, a diminished understanding of our
relationship with and responsibility for each other, a denuded
sense of community and, most significantly, a failure to
consider seriously the character of our experience of art and
its ethical implications.[57]  
This essay represents a call for such consideration, a
consideration that is largely lacking in contemporary visual art
criticism.  This situation is not unlike that noted by Arendt in
her response to the reception of her book Eichmann in
Jerusalem, where she asserts that all around her she sees
evidence of our deep-seated and dangerous fear of
judgment.[58]  According to her, it was the breakdown of
judgment, rather than of responsibility, that characterized the
early stages of the Nazi regime and which allowed that regime
to flourish.  It is a blind and silent subscription to the reigning
ideology that entrenches injustice.  In this context, judgment
opens an important space for the articulation and evaluation of
ideas and experiences with which art is concerned.
Many of the critics participating in the October round table
discussion on criticism implied that contemporary criticism is
concerned with understanding where a work of art sits in art
history.  While that is an essential project, my argument here
is that criticism should be equally preoccupied with asking
about the relationship between our experience of art and our
engagement with history per se, where history is understood
in the broadest sense to encompass both our relationship with
the past and our daily encounters with other people.  If Arendt
was correct when she wrote that “one of the central moral
questions of all time...[is] the nature and function of human
judgment,” then this moral question will, by necessity, extend
to our analysis and experience of works of art.[59]  As Levinas
explains in a different context, the experience of being judged
is not the hearing of an impersonal verdict but rather a
summons to respond.[60]  While art works are not responsible
in themselves, our thinking and writing about art and our
experience of art must be responsible if we take the reasons
for judgment, and the potential consequences of not judging,
seriously.
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